

Collaborative Innovation Center of South China Sea Studies, Nanjing University  
Maritime Security and Development Policy Report (MSDPR) No.53

# U.S.–Philippines Economic Security Cooperation under the Pax Silica Framework: An Assessment

MSDPR  
No.53  
June 2026

Author Ma Bo & Zhao Wenhan



中国南海研究协同创新中心

*Collaborative Innovation Center of South China Sea Studies*

Floor 3, Yifu Building, 22 Hankou Road, Gulou District, Nanjing, Jiangsu Province, 210093  
Tel: +86 25-83597212/+86 25-83593123 | Fax: +86 25-83597212 | Web: nanhai.nju.edu.cn

---

Collaborative Innovation Center of South China Sea  
Studies, Nanjing University  
MSDPR No.53  
June 2026

# U.S.–Philippines Economic Security Cooperation under the Pax Silica Framework: An Assessment

Author Ma Bo Zhao Wenhan

**Suggested citation:** Ma Bo, Zhao Wenhan, "U.S.–Philippine Economic Security Cooperation under the Pax Silica Framework: An Assessment", *Maritime Security and Development Policy Report*, Collaborative Innovation Center of South China Sea Studies at Nanjing University, No.53, June 2026.

**Declaration:** This Project is Supported by the Fundamental Research Funds for the Central Universities. (Project No. 2026300295)

## About Author

---



Ma Bo

Ma Bo is Associate Professor at the School of International Studies and the Collaborative Innovation Center for South China Sea Studies, Nanjing University. He was previously a Senior Visiting Fellow at the ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute in Singapore and a Chevening Scholar in the United Kingdom. He earned a Ph.D. in Political Science from the Graduate Center of the City University of New York. His book *Observing Chinese Diplomacy in the Xi Jinping Era: Top-Level Design and Key Issues* was published by World Scientific in 2018. His forthcoming monograph, *China's Quest for Peaceful Internationalism*, will be published by Routledge. His research focuses on Chinese diplomacy, international law and international relations, and Chinese and U.S. foreign policy. He teaches Public International Law and American Politics and Foreign Policy and has written over 200 commentaries for Chinese- and English-language media.

Email: [mabo@nju.edu.cn](mailto:mabo@nju.edu.cn)



Zhao Wenhan

Zhao Wenhan, Research Assistant at the Collaborative Innovation Center of South China Sea Studies, Nanjing University (2025-2026)

Email: [26095235@qq.com](mailto:26095235@qq.com)

# Table

---

Executive Summary ..... 01

The Main Policies of Pax Silica ..... 03

Principal Motivations of the United States and the  
Philippines ..... 05

Principal Implications for China ..... 07

Policy Recommendations ..... 09

# Executive Summary

---

The United States is using the Pax Silica framework to extend its cooperation with the Philippines beyond traditional defense into semiconductors, critical minerals, advanced manufacturing, data infrastructure, and industrial park development, with the aim of building a new type of strategic node on China's periphery—one that combines industrial restructuring, alliance consolidation, and crisis-support functions. Washington launched the framework in December 2025; in March 2026, it announced plans to work with Congress to provide US\$250 million for a Pax Silica Fund; and in April 2026, the Philippines signed the Pax Silica Declaration, with the two governments unveiling a 4,000-acre Economic Security Zone within the Luzon Economic Corridor, to be developed as the framework's first AI-native industrial acceleration hub. Since then, the project has moved from political announcement into institutional negotiations and investment promotion: the Philippines' Bases Conversion and Development Authority (BCDA) has stated that it has set aside roughly 4,000 acres in New Clark City for an industrial hub centered on AI innovation and investment, which will house a Pax Silica Coordination Office; and in late May, U.S. Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs Jacob Helberg indicated that the two countries are likely to conclude a long-term framework agreement relatively soon, with a roughly two-year window to work out the details and to set sectoral priorities for the zone. These developments indicate that U.S. industrial competition with China is now layering geographic positioning, control of industrial nodes, and the construction of an alliance-based industrial system on top of existing regulatory restrictions—a shift whose implications for regional security and supply chains warrant continued assessment.

## › Key Points

- **The United States is layering industrial-geographic positioning on top of regulatory**

---

**restrictions in its competition with China.** Through Pax Silica, economic corridors, and industrial park development, it is establishing critical-minerals, semiconductor, and AI supply chain nodes around China's periphery to strengthen its control over supply chains.

- **The U.S.–Philippine alliance is evolving into a composite industrial–security alliance.** Washington is seeking to couple industrial investment, job creation, and supply chain integration with military cooperation, deepening Manila's dependence on the United States and making the alliance more durable.
- **The project is strategically significant, but its implementation remains subject to considerable uncertainty.** Funding, legal arrangements, corporate investment decisions, and the Philippines' industrial base could all affect the pace and ultimate impact of the project.

### > Policy Suggestions

- **Strengthen ongoing monitoring and integrated analysis.** Track the zone's legal arrangements, corporate investment flows, and potential linkages between industrial facilities and military systems, and assess their strategic implications in a timely manner.
- **Consolidate the foundations of China–Philippine economic cooperation.** Continue to deepen cooperation in trade, infrastructure, energy, and industry, strengthen the web of shared interests, and preserve room for maneuver in bilateral relations.
- **Deepen industrial cooperation with ASEAN.** Use the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) and other platforms to expand cooperation in critical minerals, electronics manufacturing, and the digital economy, enhancing the resilience and appeal of regional supply chains.
- **Build resilience in critical industries and improve risk management.** Strengthen self-reliance and diversification in critical minerals, advanced packaging, materials and equipment, and data infrastructure, while managing public messaging on the Philippines and maritime crisis risks

# The Main Policies of Pax Silica

---

## 1. From Friend-Shoring to Economic Security Alliance-Building

At its core, Pax Silica elevates the U.S.-led restructuring of critical technology supply chains into an integrated undertaking that combines diplomacy, security, and industrial policy. The initiative seeks to build a complete "silicon supply chain" spanning critical minerals, energy, advanced manufacturing, semiconductors, AI infrastructure, and logistics, working with so-called trusted partners to reduce "coercive dependencies."<sup>1</sup> Whereas friend-shoring emphasized chiefly the geographic dispersal of production capacity, this framework stresses the simultaneous shaping of partner networks, capital mobilization, and technical standards, and has become a transnational instrument of industrial organization within U.S. economic security strategy. Under this arrangement, supply chain security shifts from a firm-level question of cost and efficiency to one of interstate institutional coordination and the division of labor within an alliance; the focus of competition lies not in any single industrial zone but in a new mode of supply chain organization built from zones and corridors.

## 2. Advancing Through Four Integrated Instruments: Declaration, Fund, Corridor, and Zone

In its mode of advancement, Pax Silica has developed a fairly clear policy sequence. First, the declaration establishes political consensus and a partner network. Second, the fund supplies policy capital: in March 2026, Washington announced that it intends, working with Congress, to direct US\$250 million in foreign assistance funding toward critical minerals extraction and processing, critical infrastructure, and manufacturing assets supporting the semiconductor supply chain, using public money to leverage co-investment by sovereign and private capital;<sup>2</sup> the money remains a proposed appropriation, however, and its full delivery depends on congressional action. Third, the Luzon Economic Corridor links ports, airports, railways, and industrial space. Fourth, industrial nodes are being established in specific partner countries. The framework has now entered the stage of resource allocation and project implementation. For the moment it resembles a non-binding policy coordination platform more than a treaty organization: it is flexible and readily accommodates countries with varying industrial capabilities, but member commitments, funding, and project

---

1 U.S. Department of State. (2026). Pax Silica. <https://www.state.gov/pax-silica>.

2 U.S. Department of State. (2026, March 26). Department of State Launches Pax Silica Fund. <https://www.state.gov/releases/office-of-the-spokesperson/2026/03/department-of-state-launches-pax-silica-fund>.

---

execution all remain subject to each country's domestic politics and corporate business judgment. The performance of the Philippine project will therefore directly shape outside assessments of whether the framework can deliver.

### 3. The Philippines as the First Publicly Launched Industrial Showcase

The Philippines became the first showcase country to host a physical industrial project for three main reasons. First, the Luzon Economic Corridor—launched at the April 2024 U.S.–Japan–Philippines trilateral summit and connecting Subic Bay, Clark, Manila, and Batangas—is the first economic corridor in the Indo-Pacific under the U.S. Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment (PGII). Second, in November 2024 the Philippines enacted Republic Act No. 12066, the CREATE MORE Act, further strengthening tax preferences and strategic-investment incentives. Third, the country possesses an established electronics manufacturing base, a relatively young workforce, and reserves of nickel, copper, cobalt, and other critical minerals. Since April 20, the BCDA has stated that it has set aside roughly 4,000 acres in New Clark City for the industrial hub and a Pax Silica Coordination Office, with initial terms including a two-year grace period on lease payments and rent thereafter to be negotiated separately,<sup>3</sup> signaling that the project has moved into the phase of physical siting and institutional construction.<sup>4</sup> For the Philippines, visible benefits—an industrial park, roads, jobs—convert into domestic political capital far more readily than abstract trade arrangements. If corporate commitments and groundbreaking on infrastructure materialize within two to three years, the Marcos Jr. administration will be able to argue at home that cooperation with the United States delivers not only security but also investment and development.

### 4. Legal and Governance Design Remains the Greatest Uncertainty

As of early June 2026, the zone's legal architecture, tax regime, security arrangements, participating companies, and investment scale have not been fully disclosed, and Washington and Manila have publicly diverged over governance arrangements. On April 16, The Wall Street Journal reported that the zone would operate under U.S. common law and enjoy embassy-like diplomatic immunity;<sup>5</sup> on May 18, the BCDA's president publicly denied any such arrangement, stating that the zone would be handled as an ordinary commercial

---

3 Bases Conversion and Development Authority. (2026, April 20). New Clark City to Serve as AI Hub Under US-Led Pax Silica Initiative. <https://www.bcda.gov.ph/news/new-clark-city-serve-ai-hub-under-us-led-pax-silica-initiative>.

4 Reuters. (2026, April 17). Philippines, US to Build Industrial Hub to Strengthen Supply Chain Security. U.S. News & World Report. <https://money.usnews.com/investing/news/articles/2026-04-16/philippines-us-to-build-industrial-hub-to-strengthen-supply-chain-security>.

5 The Wall Street Journal. (2026, April 16). U.S. to Create High-Tech Manufacturing Zone in Philippines. MSN. <https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/world/us-to-create-high-tech-manufacturing-zone-in-philippines/ar-AA2132df>.

development contract under the Philippines' Investors' Lease Act and the BCDA charter, with no special treatment for the United States;<sup>6</sup> Helberg subsequently said the immunity claim had been "taken out of context," but the supplemental agreement governing the zone's operating terms has yet to be signed.<sup>7</sup> On May 21, Reuters reported that the two sides are negotiating a long-term framework and will set specific sectoral priorities within a two-year window.<sup>8</sup> The project's direction is thus settled, but its institutional boundaries, lease arrangements, and governance rules await a subsequent framework agreement. For Washington, these questions bear on investment certainty; for Manila, on sovereignty, constitutionality, and public acceptance; for Beijing, they are the key variables for gauging the project's trajectory and regional spillover.

## Principal Motivations of the United States and the Philippines

---

### 1. U.S. Motivations: Closing the Economic Gap in Southeast Asia and Entrenching Competition with China

Washington's first purpose in advancing the Philippine project is to remedy its long-standing imbalance in Southeast Asia: strong on security, weak on economics. The United States has long sustained its influence in the Philippines through the alliance treaty, rotational base access, and joint exercises; measured against China's presence in trade, investment, and infrastructure, its development offer has been comparatively thin. Pax Silica folds critical minerals, semiconductors, AI infrastructure, and logistics capacity into a single framework, seeking to convert security advantages into industrial, capital, and rule-making advantages. On May 18, Helberg led representatives of more than a dozen U.S. companies—including 8VC, Agility Robotics, Joby Aviation, and Valar Atomics—on a visit to the proposed New Clark City site, with Foxconn's chairman also in the delegation; by the same period, the

---

6 The Philippine Star. (2026, May 19). Philippines Rejects US Request for Diplomatic Immunity at Planned AI Hub. <https://www.philstar.com/headlines/2026/05/19/2529065/philippines-rejects-us-request-diplomatic-immunity-planned-ai-hub>

7 The Philippine Star. (2026, May 26). US Official Says Immunity for Pax Silica Clark Hub 'Taken Out of Context'. <https://www.philstar.com/business/2026/05/26/2530687/us-official-says-immunity-pax-silica-clark-hub-taken-out-context>

8 Reuters. (2026, May 21). US, Philippines to Reach Deal on Economic Security Zone 'Sooner Rather Than Later', US Official Says. <https://www.reuters.com/world/china/us-philippines-reach-deal-economic-security-zone-sooner-rather-than-later-us-2026-05-21/>

---

number of signatories had grown from 13, when the Philippines joined, to 15. Washington is using the Philippine project as a platform for investment promotion, corporate mobilization, and membership expansion, and its toolkit for competing with China is extending from restrictive measures toward organized industrial networks. Most ASEAN states are reluctant to take sides outright on security and care more about investment, jobs, and markets. Pax Silica attempts to recast security issues as industrial opportunities, increasing the economic substance of U.S. regional strategy.

## 2. Upgrading the Alliance into a Composite Industrial–Security Alliance

For the United States, the Philippines' value no longer lies solely in military coordination in the South China Sea; it also lies in the country's potential as a rear-area industrial anchor. A composite industrial–security alliance, as used here, denotes an alliance in which industrial investment, supply chain integration, infrastructure development, and military cooperation reinforce one another. In 2023, the two countries added four sites under the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA)—three in northern Luzon and one in Palawan—marking a clear northward shift in the alliance's security focus.<sup>9</sup> If Pax Silica generates industrial parks, employment, and local fiscal revenue along the Luzon Corridor, it will convert the alliance's payoffs from bases and exercises into industrial benefits, reducing the likelihood that a future change of government in Manila produces a sharp swing in policy toward the United States. Unlike military cooperation, which readily stirs controversy over sovereignty and maritime incidents, industrial projects—once they produce jobs and tax revenue—settle into local networks of interest, lending the alliance economic stickiness and making it less dependent on individual leaders' positions or short-term security events.

## 3. Philippine Motivations: Leveraging U.S. and Japanese Capital and Technology for Industrial Upgrading

Manila's most immediate motive for supporting the framework is to harness American and Japanese resources to upgrade its manufacturing sector. In 2024, the Philippine Department of Finance publicly declared that economic security is the bedrock of national security and identified the Luzon Economic Corridor as the key space for attracting manufacturing and semiconductor supply chain investment.<sup>10</sup> The country's semiconductor

---

9 U.S. Department of Defense. (2023, April 3). Philippines, U.S. Announce Locations of Four New EDCA Sites. <https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/3349257/>

10 Philippine Department of Finance. (2024, April 16). Recto: PBBM's Historic Working Visit to Washington for the Trilateral Leaders' Summit Ensures Economic Security for Filipinos. <https://www.dof.gov.ph/recto-pbbms-historic-working-visit-to-washington-for-the-trilateral-leaders-summit-ensures-economic-security-for-filipinos/>

and electronics industry roadmap targets a combined US\$110 billion in semiconductor and electronics exports by 2030—US\$70 billion in semiconductors and US\$40 billion in other electronics.<sup>11</sup> For the Marcos Jr. administration, Pax Silica helps cast cooperation with the United States as an industrial upgrading dividend and creates policy facts on the ground that will be difficult to reverse before the 2028 election. Whether the Philippines can use the project to move into higher-value-added segments, however, remains constrained by electricity prices, logistics efficiency, technical talent, and local supplier capacity. Judging from the composition of the mid-May delegation, the zone's initial priorities lean toward advanced manufacturing and supporting critical infrastructure, and full wafer-fabrication capacity is unlikely in the near term; if infrastructure and talent gaps are not addressed in parallel, the zone may remain confined to assembly, warehousing, and basic processing. Domestic debate over sovereignty, job quality, and the distribution of benefits could also weigh on the project's acceptance.

## Principal Implications for China

---

### 1. Supply Chain Restructuring Moves from Policy Declarations to Physical Positioning

Pax Silica's landing in the Philippines marks the point at which U.S. supply chain competition with China moves from policy declaration to physical positioning. Washington previously relied mainly on tariffs, export controls, investment screening, and the concept of friend-shoring to drive supply chain adjustment;<sup>12</sup> it is now using zones, corridors, and funds to organize critical minerals processing, advanced packaging, and data infrastructure directly on China's periphery.<sup>13</sup> If the New Clark City project proceeds smoothly, the United States will acquire a physical node combining resource, manufacturing, and logistics functions near the South China Sea and the Taiwan Strait, placing sustained competitive pressure on China's comparative advantages in critical minerals processing and midstream electronics manufacturing. Once in place, physical positioning is path-dependent: zones, ports, and data

---

11 The Manila Times. (2026, April 9). PH Aims to Hit \$110B in Electronics Exports. <https://www.manilatimes.net/2026/04/09/business/top-business/ph-aims-to-hit-110b-in-electronics-exports/2316705>

12 U.S. Department of the Treasury. (2022, July 12). Readout: Secretary of the Treasury Janet L. Yellen's Meeting With Japanese Business Leaders on Bolstering Supply Chain Resiliency and Expanding Friend-Shoring. <https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy0856>

13 Daily Tribune. (2026, May 18). U.S. Exec Visits Site of Planned Clark AI Hub. <https://tribune.net.ph/2026/05/18/us-exec-visits-site-of-planned-clark-ai-hub>

---

centers accumulate networks of interest through contracts, investment, and employment, allowing projects to outlast shifts in American domestic politics.

## 2. Emerging Industry–Logistics Integration around the South China Sea and the Taiwan Strait

There is evident strategic interplay among the Luzon Economic Corridor, the EDCA sites in northern Luzon, and the port and air assets at Subic Bay and Clark. Publicly available information does not show the zone being put to military use, but the United States is expanding its presence in the Philippines from standalone military sites into a composite system of military sites, rear-area industry, and logistics resilience. Should the zone develop reliable power, data centers, and industrial logistics, it could in a crisis enhance the capacity of the United States and its allies to sustain operations and restore supply on the southern flank of the Taiwan Strait and in the South China Sea, subjecting China's security environment to more durable, systemic pressure. It should be noted that no publicly confirmed subordinate relationship exists between the Economic Security Zone and military facilities, and the zone cannot be equated with an expansion of military bases. In a crisis, however, industrial logistics, data infrastructure, and port–air connectivity could indirectly improve the alliance system's endurance—and because such support takes commercial and developmental form, it attracts far less scrutiny.

## 3. The Philippines' Room to Swing Back toward China May Narrow Further

Philippine policy toward China has historically oscillated, pulled by domestic political turnover on one side and expectations of external investment and security on the other. Once Pax Silica generates parks, jobs, and local fiscal revenue in the Philippines, it will embed local governments, business capital, and technocrats more deeply in U.S.-led industrial networks, narrowing China's ability to shape Philippine policy through economic ties. Visible gains could also produce a demonstration effect on Vietnam, Malaysia, and others, compressing the space available to China to shape its neighborhood through regional cooperation and the Belt and Road Initiative.

## 4. Near-Term Constraints: Law, Funding, and the Industrial Base

At the same time, the project has yet to take final shape. The long-term U.S.–Philippine framework is still under negotiation; the US\$250 million fund is subject to congressional procedure; the roster of companies and the scale of investment remain undisclosed; the two governments' public positions on governance still diverge; and Philippine infrastructure, electricity costs, and local supplier capacity could slow progress. On balance, the project's direction is clear and its potential considerable, but near-term uncertainty remains high—leaving China a window in which to observe, assess, and adjust.

# Policy Recommendations

---

## 1. Strengthen Integrated Research, Tracking Legal, Corporate, and Civil–Military Indicators

Relevant agencies and research institutions should fold Pax Silica, the Luzon Economic Corridor, the northward shift of EDCA, and Philippine semiconductor and critical minerals policy into a single research framework, watching for three kinds of change: whether legal arrangements drift toward special governance, long-term leases, or judicial immunity; whether the zone attracts leading American, Japanese, and South Korean firms in sufficient depth to form supply chains; and whether de facto linkages emerge between the zone and ports, airports, energy systems, and military support infrastructure. These developments will determine whether the project remains a political symbol or evolves into a replicable regional economic security node.

## 2. Stabilize the Economic Foundation of China–Philippines Cooperation and Preserve Room for Maneuver

The Philippines is acutely sensitive at present to foreign investment, exports, and employment. China should avoid concentrating its Philippine policy resources excessively on maritime disputes and instead maintain a steady, visible supply of cooperation in trade and development. Selective opportunities can be offered in agricultural trade, local infrastructure, energy, and digital public services, alongside closer ties with local governments, the business community, and the education and technology sectors—stabilizing the bilateral relationship while preventing the perception from taking hold in Philippine society that the country depends on the United States for both security and development.

## 3. Shape an Open Industrial Cooperation Network with ASEAN to Blunt Spillover Effects

A key U.S. objective for Pax Silica is to use the Philippines as a template that draws in other countries capable of absorbing relocated capacity; China should work at the regional level to preserve an open and inclusive environment for industrial cooperation. Drawing on RCEP, China–ASEAN cooperation mechanisms, and bilateral economic arrangements, Beijing can pursue more targeted supply chain cooperation focused on critical minerals processing, electronic components, energy storage, and digital infrastructure; deepen ties of interest with Vietnam, Malaysia, and Indonesia through projects, orders, and market arrangements; and keep channels open with Japan and South Korea on supply chain issues.

## 4. Build Resilience in Critical Industries and Manage Public Communication and Risk

Industrially, the Philippine project should be read as a medium- to long-term early-

---

warning signal. For nickel, cobalt, rare earths, and other critical resources, China should diversify sources, build overseas equity positions, and develop recycling systems; in semiconductors, it should simultaneously strengthen supporting capabilities in advanced packaging, materials and equipment, and industrial software. On security, China should uphold its principles while strengthening maritime crisis management, lest high-intensity confrontation push the Philippines further into one-sided alignment with the United States in both security and economics. In public communication, academic exchanges and think-tank dialogues on sovereignty, the environment, labor, and the distribution of benefits can encourage reasoned Philippine debate over the project's costs and benefits; official statements should be factually grounded and measured in tone. Chinese firms operating abroad should likewise raise their compliance and social responsibility standards: environmental, labor, and community relations increasingly determine whether projects endure, and China's offer must place greater weight on green standards, local employment, and transparent communication, beyond commercial efficiency alone.

# About Us

---

## › Collaborative Innovation Center of South China Sea Studies, Nanjing University

Founded in July 2012, the Center was initiated by Nanjing University and has been greatly supported by three governmental departments: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China, the People's Government of Hainan Province, and the State Oceanic Administration. The Center mainly conducts multidisciplinary collaborative innovation, following the mode of "arts and sciences-army and local-universities and institutes-school and school collaboration". The Collaborative Innovation Center of South China Sea Studies promotes comprehensive research on the South China Sea and serves for the national strategic decisions on the South China Sea.

## › Maritime Security and Development Policy Report

The series of Maritime Security and Development Policy Reports of the Collaborative Innovation Center of South China Sea Studies was launched in June 2022, aiming to become the most authoritative and world-class think-tank policy research report on maritime issues in China. This series of reports will be featured as authoritative, dynamic and forward-looking, providing in-depth analysis and countermeasure suggestions on maritime strategy, security, legal and development issues that have a significant impact on China. The report will be open to scholars from academic institutions and well-known think tanks both at home and abroad.

## › Editorial Membership

Chief Editor: Zhu Feng, Executive Director of the Collaborative Innovation Center of South China Sea Studies

Executive Editor: Ma Bo, Associate Professor of the Collaborative Innovation Center of South China Sea Studies

Assistant of Chief Editor: Wang Yu, Ph.D. Student of School of International Studies, Nanjing University

Editor: Zhao Wenhan, Research Assistant of the Collaborative Innovation Center of South China Sea Studies

## › Contact Us

Address: Floor 3, Yifu Building, 22 Hankou Road, Gulou District, Nanjing, Jiangsu Province

Email: [msdpr@nju.edu.cn](mailto:msdpr@nju.edu.cn)

# Previous Issues

Issue	Title	Author
No.52 (May 2026)	Pragmatic Cooperation in the South China Sea under the Framework of Building a China–Vietnam Community with a Shared Future	Zhao Weihua
No.51 (April 2026)	Rules and Disarray: A Ten-Year Assessment of the South China Sea Arbitration Award	Zheng Zhihua
No.50 (March 2026)	From Davos to Munich: Maritime Security Anxiety and Strategic Adjustment Amid the Fragmentation of the Global Order	Zhu Feng
No.49 (February 2026)	Can China and Australia Save the World? Win–Win Diplomacy in Troubled Times	Mark Beeson
No.48 (January 2026)	Innovations of China's Maritime Sovereignty Governance: Institutional Design and Policy Logic of Huangyan Island National Nature Reserve	Li Lingqun&Ge Xinying
No.47 (December 2025)	Accelerated Alignment: Trends and Prospects of U.S.– Philippines Relations in Trump's Second Term	Du Lan
No.46 (November 2025)	How Stable is the Upward Trajectory in Australia-China Relations	James Laurenceson
No.45 (November 2025)	New Developments in the AUKUS and Corresponding Policy Recommendations	Xu Shaomin
No.44 (October 2025)	Challenges and Strategic Responses in China–ASEAN Relations under Trump 2.0	Lawrence Anderson
No.43 (September 2025)	From "Three Seas Linkage" to "One Theater": New Trends in Japan's Security Strategy	Zhu Qingxiu
No.42 (August 2025)	The Security Role of Japan in the U.S. Indo-Pacific Alliance and Partner Network	Zhao Minghao&Qiu Jiachang

[Click to view all past content](#)